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An Efficient Privacy-Preserving Outsourced
Calculation Toolkit With Multiple Keys
Ximeng Liu, Member, IEEE, Robert H. Deng, Fellow, IEEE,
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Senior Member, IEEE, and Jian Weng
Abstract— In this paper, we propose a toolkit for efficient
and privacy-preserving outsourced calculation under multiple
encrypted keys (EPOM). Using EPOM, a large scale of users
can securely outsource their data to a cloud server for storage.
Moreover, encrypted data belonging to multiple users can be
processed without compromising on the security of the individual
user’s (original) data and the final computed results. To reduce
the associated key management cost and private key exposure
risk in EPOM, we present a distributed two-trapdoor public-key
cryptosystem, the core cryptographic primitive. We also present
the toolkit to ensure that the commonly used integer operations
can be securely handled across different encrypted domains.
We then prove that the proposed EPOM achieves the goal of
secure integer number processing without resulting in privacy
leakage of data to unauthorized parties. Last, we demonstrate
the utility and the efficiency of EPOM using simulations.
Index Terms— Privacy-preserving, homomorphic encryption,
outsourced computation, multiple keys.
I. INTRODUCTION
CLOUD computing due to its capability to sup-port real-time and massive storing and processing
of data, is increasingly used in domains such as Inter-
net of Things (IoT) [1], e-commerce [2], and scientific
research [3]–[5]. It is, therefore, unsurprising that cloud com-
puting is considered a viable solution to address the demands
due to a significant increase in storage media and the num-
ber of digital and Internet-connected devices (e.g. Internet
of Things and medical devices). For example, in 2011, the
U.S Federal Government adopted a ‘Cloud First’ policy which
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requires government agency’s Chief Information Officers to
implement a cloud-based service whenever there was a secure,
reliable, and cost-effective option [6], [7]. Despite the benefits
afforded by the use of cloud computing, data security and
privacy remain areas of ongoing focus. For example, in the
final US Government Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap
published by the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST), security and privacy are considered one of
the high-priority requirements [8], and a number of dedicated
cloud computing research labs, such as [9] and [10], have been
established in recent years.
In attempts to conserve resources, reduce operational costs,
and maintain efficiency, cloud service providers often store
data belonging to multiple users on the same server (i.e. multi-
tenancy) [11]. Therefore, different users should be distrib-
uted with an individual key (i.e. multiple keys [12], a.k.a,
multi-key), to avoid multi-tenancy related attacks (e.g. a user’s
private data viewed by other unauthorized users). One applica-
tion of the multi-key setting is e-healthcare cloud [13], where
patients can transmit and store their health related information
(e.g. patient’s heart rate, blood pressure and glucose levels)
on the hospital’s cloud servers. This will facilitate diagnosis
of the patients’ physical condition based on the information.
It is, however, important to ensure the security and privacy
of patient’s health and other personally identifiable informa-
tion (PII), such as health status. The privacy of decision
making model used is also considered by the e-health service
provider as a trade secret. One way to achieve the security and
privacy of the data is to issue all users (e.g. patients and service
provider) different (unique) keys. In addition, an e-health
service provider uses patients’ health and PII (encrypted under
different keys) in their training decision model. For example,
historical medical data are used to train Naïve Bayesian
classifier in Clinical Decision Support System (CDSS) [14].
However, achieving secure calculation over the data under
multiple keys without comprising the privacy of individual
data remains a hard problem.
In this paper, we propose an Efficient Privacy-
preserving Outsourced calculation framework with Multiple
keys (EPOM) to address the above-mentioned challenge.
We regard the contributions of this paper to be four-fold,
namely:
• Our proposed EPOM is designed to allow different data
providers to outsource their data (e.g. data belonging to
users from different data providers) to the cloud server
for secure storage and processing.
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• We construct a new cryptographic primitive, Distrib-
uted Two Trapdoors Public-Key Cryptosystem (DT-PKC),
which is deployed in EPOM to split a strong private key
into different shares. This will allow us to reduce the risk
of private key leakage and private key management cost
in a multi-key setting.
• We build a privacy-preserving outsourced calculation
toolkit of integer numbers with multiple keys. The toolkit
consists of commonly used elementary operations, such
as multiplication, division, comparison, sorting, sign bit
acquisition, equivalence testing and greatest common
divisor. The extension of the toolkit can also securely
store and process real numbers.
• We then demonstrate the utility of EPOM using a pur-
posefully built simulator in Java, which demonstrates that
our proposal can effectively and securely outsources the
storage and process of data in a multiple keys setting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we describe the preliminaries required in the
understanding of our proposed EPOM. In Section III, we
formalize the system model, as well as outlining the prob-
lem statement and the attacker model. Then, we present
DT-PKC and secure multi-key calculation toolkit of integer
in Sections IV and V, respectively. The security analysis and
performance evaluation are presented in Sections VI and VII,
respectively. Related work is discussed in Section VIII.
Section IX concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we outline the notations used in the
paper. We also define the Additive Homomorphic Cryptosys-
tem (AHC) and Secure Bit-Decomposition (SBD) Protocol,
which are the building blocks in the proposed EPOM.
Throughout the paper, we use pki and ski to denote the
public key and weak private key of party i , respectively.
pk denotes the joint public key (see Section IV for the
construction), SK denotes the system strong private key,
and SK (1) and SK (2) denote the partial strong private keys.
Furthermore, we denote [x]pki as the encrypted data x under
pki , Dsk(·) as the decryption algorithm using sk, L(x) as the
bit-length of x , and |x | to represent the absolute value of x .
A. Additive Homomorphic Cryptosystem
Suppose [m1]pk and [m2]pk are two additive homomor-
phic ciphertexts under the same public key pk in an
additive homomorphic cryptosystem. The additive homo-
morphic cryptosystem (e.g. Paillier cryptosystem [15] and
Benaloh cryptosystem [16]) has the additive homomorphism
property:
Dsk([m1]pk · [m2]pk) = m1 + m2.
B. Secure Bit-Decomposition Protocol (SBD)
Suppose that there are two parties in the protocol, Alice
and Bob. Bob holds the AHC encrypted value [x]pk , where
0 ≤ x < 2μ and μ is the domain size of x in bits.
We also remark that x is known to neither Alice nor Bob.
Fig. 1. System model under consideration.
Let (xμ−1, · · · , x0) denotes the binary representation of x ,
where x0 and xμ−1 are the least and most significant bits,
respectively. The goal of SBD is to convert the encryption
of x into the encryption of the individual bits of x , without
disclosing any information regarding x to both parties. More
formally, we define the SBD protocol as follows:
([xμ−1]pk, · · · , [x0]pk) ← SBD([x]pk).
We refer the interested reader to [17] for the detailed construc-
tion of the SBD protocol.
III. SYSTEM MODEL & PRIVACY REQUIREMENT
In this section, we formalize the EPOM system model,
outline the problem statement, and define the attack model.
A. System Model
In our system, we mainly focus on how the cloud server
responds to user request in a privacy-preserving manner. The
system comprises a Key Generation Center (KGC), a Cloud
Platform (CP), a Computation Service Provider (CSP), Data
Providers (DPs) and Request Users (RUs) – see Fig. 1.
1. KGC: The trusted KGC is tasked with the distribution and
management of both public and private keys in the system.
2. DP: Generally, a DP will use its public key to encrypt
some data, before storing the encrypted data with a CP.
3. CP: A CP has ‘unlimited’ data storage space, and stores
and manages data outsourced from all registered RUs. A CP
also stores all intermediate and final results in encrypted form.
Furthermore, a CP is able to perform certain calculations over
encrypted data.
4. CSP: A CSP provides online computation services to
users. The CSP is also able to partial decrypt ciphertexts
sent by the CP, perform certain calculations over the partial
decrypted data, and then re-encrypt the calculated results.
5. RUs: The goal of a RU is to request a CP to perform
some calculations over the encrypted data under multiple keys.
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After the calculation has been performed, the result can be
decrypted by RU upon successful authentication.
B. Problem Statement
Consider a database T that contains α records with
β dimensions xi, j (1 ≤ i ≤ α; 1 ≤ j ≤ β), where xi, j
is a integer number and belongs to DP k. Such data need
to be encrypted prior to being outsourced to a CP for storage
and maintenance. A RU can issue a query to the CP in order
to obtain some statistic information about T . For example,
the RU can query for the mean and variance over some
dimension j (i.e. calculates the mean x¯ j = ∑αi=1 xi, j /α and
the variance d j = ∑αi=1(xi, j − x¯ j )2/α). The RU can also
perform some self-defined calculations (e.g. calculates the sum
X = ∑βj=1 xi, j , or multiplication X ′ =
∏β
j=1 xi, j ). Since xi, j
is required to be outsourced to the cloud for storage, we have
the following challenges:
1) Secure Outsourced Storage: As the cloud storage service
is often provided by third-party servers who may be untrusted
or semi-trusted, it is important for DP to outsource the data
to the cloud without compromising its own privacy.
2) Secure Processing Toolkit for Integer: In order to achieve
data processing on-the-fly, the encrypted integer calculation
toolkit needs to be built to support commonly used integer
number operations over the plaintext. For example, additions,
multiplications and divisions should be achievable by operat-
ing on two encrypted numbers.
3) Secure Processing under Multiple Keys: In order to
support outsourced data processing across different parties,
a multi-key data calculation mechanism (e.g. comparison of
encrypted numbers under different public keys) needs to be
constructed. Moreover, as the final result contains informa-
tion belonging to different parties, fine-grained authentication
mechanisms should be designed to guarantee the privacy of
individual DP.
C. Attack Model
In our attack model, we consider the KGC to be a trusted
entity, which generates the public and private keys for the
system. On the other hand, RUs, DPs, CP and CSP are
curious-but-honest parties, which strictly follow the proto-
col. However, RUs, DPs, CP and CSP are also interested to
learn data belonging to other parties. Therefore, we introduce
an active adversary A∗ in our model. The goal of A∗ is
to decrypt the challenge DP’s original ciphertext and the
challenge RU’s encrypted final results with the following
capabilities:
1) A∗ may eavesdrop all communications to obtain the
encrypted data.
2) A∗ may compromise the CP to guess the plaintext value
of all ciphertexts outsourced from the DPs (including the
challenge DPs), and all ciphertext sent from the CSP by
executing an interactive protocol.
3) A∗ may compromise the CSP to guess the plaintext value
of all ciphertexts sent from the CP by executing an interactive
protocol.
4) A∗ may compromise one or more RUs and DPs, with
the exception of the challenge RU or challenge DP, to obtain
access to their decryption capabilities, and guess all ciphertexts
belonging to the challenge RU or challenge DP.
The adversary A∗ is, however, restricted from compro-
mising (1) both the CSP and the CP concurrently, (2) the
challenge DP, and (3) the challenge RU. We remark that
such restrictions are typical in adversary models used in
cryptographic protocols (see the review of adversary models
in [18] and [19]).
IV. BASIC CRYPTO–DISTRIBUTED TWO TRAPDOORS
PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM (DT-PKC)
In order to realize EPOM, the public-key cryptosystem
with a double trapdoor decryption cryptosystem introduced
by Bresson et al. [20] could be a suitable solution for key
management in the multi-key setting at first glance. However,
the strong trapdoor leakage is a risk to the system, since
encrypted data in Bresson et al.’s cryptosystem can be
decrypted by the strong trapdoor. Therefore, we design a
new cryptosystem – Distributed Two Trapdoors Public-Key
Cryptosystem (DT-PKC) – to split a strong private key into
different shares. In addition, the weak decryption algorithm
should support distributed decryption to solve the authorization
problem in the multi-key environment (see Section V-I). Our
DT-PKC is based on Bresson et al.’s cryptosystem [20],
follows the idea in [21], and works as follows:
KeyGen: Given a security parameter k and two large prime
numbers p, q , where L(p) = L(q) = k, we have two strong
primes p′, q ′, s.t., p′ = p−12 and q ′ = q−12 (due to the
property of the strong primes). We then compute N = pq and
λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1)/2, define a function L(x) = x−1N ,
and choose a generator g of order (p − 1)(q − 1)/2 (this
can be achieved by selecting a random number a ∈ Z∗N2 and
computing g as g = −a2N [22]). We also randomly select
θi ∈ [1, N/4] and compute hi = gθi mod N2 for party i . The
public key for i is pki = (N, g, hi ), and the corresponding
weak private key is ski = θi . The system’s strong private key
is SK = λ.
Encryption (Enc): Given a message m ∈ ZN , we choose a
random number r ∈ [1, N/4]. The ciphertext under pki can be
generated as [m]pki = {Ti,1, Ti,2}, where Ti,1 = grθi (1 + m N)
mod N2; Ti,2 = gr mod N2.
Decryption With Weak Private Key (WDec): [m]pki can
be decrypted using decryption algorithm Dski (·) with weak
private key ski = θi :
m = L(Ti,1
T θii,2
mod N2).
Decryption With Strong Private Key (SDec): Any ciphertext
[m]pki can be decrypted using decryption algorithm DS K (·)
with strong private key SK = λ by first calculating:
T λi,1 mod N2 = gλ·θir (1 + m Nλ) mod N2 = (1 + m Nλ).
Then, due to gcd(λ, N) = 1, m can be recovered as follows:
m = L(T λi,1 mod N2)λ−1 mod N.
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Strong Private Key Splitting (SkeyS): The strong private key
SK = λ can be randomly split into two parts. The partial
strong private keys are denoted as SK (i) = λ j ( j = 1, 2),
s.t., λ1 + λ2 ≡ 0 mod λ and λ1 + λ2 ≡ 1 mod N2 hold at
the same time (the existence of the strong private key splitting
can be found in Section VI-A1).
Partial Decryption With Partial Strong Private Key Step
One (PSDec1): Once [m]pki = {Ti,1, Ti,2} is received, the
PSDec1 algorithm P DOS K (1) (·) can be run as follows:
Using partial strong private key SK (1) = λ1, the partial
decrypted ciphertext CT (1)i can be calculated as:
CT (1)i = (Ti,1)λ1 = grθi λ1(1 + m Nλ1) mod N2.
Partial Decryption With Partial Strong Private Key Step
Two (PSDec2): Once CT (1)i and [m]pki are received, the
PSDec2 algorithm P DTS K (2) (·, ·) can be run to obtain the
original message m, i.e., the PSDec2 first executes
CT (2)i = (Ti,1)λ2 = grθi λ2(1 + m Nλ2) mod N2.
Then, the algorithm computes T ′′ = CT (1)i · CT (2)i , and
calculates
m = L(T ′′).
Partial Decryption With Partial Weak Private Key Step
One (PWDec1): Once [m]pkρ = {Tρ,1, Tρ,2}1 is received,
the PWDec1 algorithm can be run with partial private key
ski = θi . The partial weak decrypted ciphertext W T (i) can be
calculated as:
W T (i) = (Tρ,2)θi = grθi mod N2.
Partial Decryption With Partial Weak Private Key Step
Two (PWDec2): Once [m]pkρ , W T (1), · · · , W T (κ) are
received, the PWDec2 algorithm can be run as follows:
Using partial private key skρ = θρ , the partial weak
decrypted ciphertext W T (ρ) can be calculated as:
W T (ρ) = (Tρ,2)θρ = grθρ mod N2.
We then calculate W T = ∏κi=1 W T (i) · W T (ρ) and
m = L(Tρ,1
W T
mod N2).
Ciphertext Refresh (CR): Once [m]pki is received, the
CR algorithm can refresh the ciphertext without changing
the original message m, by randomly choosing r ′ ∈ ZN and
refreshing the ciphertext as [m]′pki = {T ′i,1, T ′i,2}, where
T ′i,1 = Ti,1 · hr
′
i mod N
2; T ′i,2 = Ti,2 · gr
′
mod N2
Note that for given m1, m2 ∈ ZN under the same pk, we
have
[m1]pk · [m2]pk = {(1 + (m1 + m2) · N) · hr1+r2 mod N2,
gr1+r2 mod N2} = [m1 + m2]pk .
([m]pk)N−1 = {(1 + (N − 1)m · N) · h(N−1)r1 mod N2,
g(N−1)r1 mod N2} = [−m]pk .
1The joint public key is constructed as pkρ = (N, g, hρ =
gθρ+
∑
j=1,··· ,κ θ j ) which associates with DP j ( j = 1, · · · , κ) and RU ρ.
In the system, we have η RU and κ DP. The KGC
first generates pki = (N, g, hi = gθi ) and ski = θi
(i = 1, · · · , η + κ) under the same N and g, and sends
the individual public-private key pair to each RU and DP.
Moreover, the SK should be randomly split into SK (1) and
SK (2) using SkeyS algorithm, prior sending to CP and CSP
for storage respectively. In addition, DP i can encrypt data
with their own public key pki , and outsource the cipher-
texts to the CP for storage. Moreover, the DP’s public key
pk j ( j = 1, · · · , κ) and joint public key pkk (k = 1, · · · , η)
should be sent to CP and CSP. For simplicity, if all the
ciphertexts with joint key are associated with the RU ρ, we
will simply omit the subscript ρ from the symbols (e.g., use
pk instead of pkρ ) for simplicity / readability.
V. PRIVACY PRESERVING INTEGER CALCULATION
TOOLKIT FOR MULTIPLE KEYS
After introducing the underlying algorithms in DT-PKC,
we will now present the secure sub-protocols as the toolkit
for processing integers, namely: Secure Addition Protocol
across Domains (SAD), Secure Multiplication Protocol across
Domains (SMD), Secure Sign Bit Acquisition Protocol (SSBA)
Secure Less Than Protocol (SLT), Secure Maximum and
Minimum Sorting Protocol (SMMS), Secure Equivalent Testing
Protocol (SEQ), Secure Division Protocol (SDIV) and Secure
Greatest Common Divisor Protocol (SGCD). We assume that
both CP and CSP will be involved in the sub-protocol, as
the CP holds a partial strong private key SK (1), and the CSP
has the remaining partial strong private key SK (2) and public
key pk . Note that both x, y involved in the above sub-
protocols are integer (i.e. x, y can be positive, negative or
zero); therefore, we restrict |x | and |y| to be in the range
of [0, R1], where L(R1) < L(N)/8. If a larger plaintext range
is needed, we can simply use a larger N . A larger N implies
a broader plaintext range, and therefore, a higher level of
security. However, this will affect the efficiency of DT-PKC
(See Fig. 2(a)).
A. Secure Addition Protocol Across Domains (SAD)
Our DT-PKC cryptosystem can support additive homomor-
phism; however, it can only be achieved under the same public
key (i.e. [m1+m2]pk = [m1]pk ·[m2]pk). Our SAD is designed
for plaintext addition over encrypted data with different keys.
In other words, given two encrypted data [x]pka and [y]pkb
under different keys, the goal of SAD protocol is to calculate
[x + y]pk . The description of the SAD protocol is as follows:
Step-1 (@CP): Chooses a random number ra, rb ∈ ZN ,
calculates
X = [x]pka · [ra]pka = [x + ra]pka ,
Y = [y]pkb · [rb]pkb = [y + rb]pkb ,
calculates X ′ = P DOS K (1) (X) and Y ′ = P DOS K (1) (Y ), and
sends X , Y , X ′ and Y ′ to CSP.
Step-2 (@CSP): Calculates X ′′ = P DTS K (2)(X ′; X) and
Y ′′ = P DTS K (2) (Y ′; Y ), calculates S = X ′′ + Y ′′, encrypts S
as [S]pk , and sends the encrypted data to CP.
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Fig. 2. Evaluation findings. (a) Run time of DT-PKC (vary with bit length of N ). (b) Run time of DT-PKC (vary with bit length of N ). (c) Run time on
CP (vary with bit length of N ). (d) Run time on CSP (vary with bit length of N ). (e) Communication cost (vary with bit length of N ). (f) Run time on CP
(vary with bit length of N ). (g) Run time on CSP (vary with bit length of N ). (h) Communication costs between CP and CSP (vary with bit length of N ).
(i) Run time on CP (vary with plaintext domain). (j) Run time on CSP (vary with plaintext domain). (k) Communication cost between CP and CSP (vary
with plaintext domain).
Step-3 (@CP): CP calculates R = ra + rb, uses pk to
encrypt R as [R]pk , and calculates
[S]pk · ([R]pk )N−1 = [S − R]pk = [x + y]pk
B. Secure Multiplication Protocol Across Domains (SMD)
Given two encrypted data [x]pka and [y]pkb under two
different public keys pka and pkb, respectively, the goal
of SMD is to calculate [x · y]pk under pk . The description
of SMD is as follows:
Step-1 (@CP): CP selects four random numbers
rx , ry, Rx , Ry ∈ ZN , calculates
X = [x]pka · [rx ]pka , Y = [y]pkb · [ry]pkb ,
S = [Rx ]pka · ([x]pka )N−ry = [Rx − ry · x]pka ,
T = [Ry]pkb · ([y]pkb)N−rx = [Ry − rx · y]pkb ,
calculates X1 = P DOS K (1) (X), Y1 = P DOS K (1) (Y ),
S1 = P DOS K (1) (S), and T1 = P DOS K (1) (T ), and sends X1,
Y1, S1, T1, X , Y , S, T to CSP.
Step-2 (@CSP): Using the other partial strong private key
SK (2), CSP calculates
h = P DTS K (2)(X1; X) · P DTS K (2)(Y1; X),
S2 = P DTS K (2)(S1; S), T2 = P DTS K (2) (T1; T ).
CSP encrypts h, S2, T2 using pk , denoted as H = [h]pk ,
S3 = [S2]pk , T3 = [T2]pk , and sends H , S3 and T3 to CP.
It is trivial to verify that h = (x + rx )(y + ry).
Step-3 (@CP): Once H , S3 and T3 are received,
CP computes S4 = ([rx · ry]pk )N−1, S5 = ([Rx ]pk )N−1 and
S6 = ([Ry]pk )N−1, and calculates the following to recover
the encrypted x · y:
H · T3 · S3 · S4 · S5 · S6 = [(h + (Rx − ry · x) + (Ry − rx · y)
− rx · ry − Rx − Ry)]pk
= [x · y]pk .
C. Secure Sign Bit Acquisition Protocol (SSBA)
Given an encrypted integer number [x]pka , the goal of SSBA
protocol is to obtain the encrypted sign bit [s∗]pk and the
transformed number [x∗]pk , s.t., x∗ = x and s∗ = 1 when
x ≥ 0, while x∗ = N − x and s∗ = 0 when x < 0. The
description of the SSBA protocol is as follows:
Step-1 (@CP): CP flips a coin s, and chooses a random
number r , s.t. L(r) < L(N)/4. If s = 1, CP calculates
[l]pka = (([x]pka )2 · [1]pka )r = [r(2x + 1)]pka .2
2We transform x into 2x + 1 in order to prevent CSP to know the value x
when x = 0.
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If s = 0, CP calculates
[l]pka = (([x]pka )2 · [1]pka )N−r = [−r(2x + 1)]pka .
Then, CP calculates L = P DOS K (1) ([l]pka ) and sends
L and [l]pka to CSP.
Step-2 (@CSP): CSP calculates P DTS K (2)(L; [l]pka ) to
obtain l. If L(l) < 3/8 · L(N), denotes u = 1; otherwise,
u = 0.
Then, u is encrypted using pk, and [u]pk is sent to CSP.
Step-3 (@CP): (1) If s = 1, CP calculates
[s∗]pk = CR([u]pk);
otherwise, calculates [s∗]pk = CR([1]pk · [u]N−1pk ).(2) CP then calculates
[x∗]pk ← SMD([x]pk ; [s∗]2pk · ([1]pk)N−1).
D. Secure Less Than Protocol (SLT)
Given two encrypted numbers [x]pka and [y]pkb , the goal of
SLT protocol is to obtain the encrypted data [u∗]pk to show
the relationship between the plaintext of the two encrypted
data (i.e. x ≥ y or x < y). The description of the SLT protocol
is as follows:
Step-1: (1) CP calculates
[x1]pka = ([x]pka )2 · [1]pka = [2x + 1]pka ;
[y1]pkb = ([y]pkb )2 = [2y]pkb .3
(2) CP flips a coin s randomly. If s = 1, CP calculates
[l]pk ← SAD([x1]pka ; ([y1]pkb )N−1).
If s = 0, CP calculates
[l]pk ← SAD([y1]pkb ; ([x1]pka )N−1).
(3) CP chooses a random number r , s.t., s.t. L(r)<L(N)/4,
and calculates [l1]pk = ([l]pk )r . Then, CP uses SK (1)
to calculate K = P DOS K (1) ([l1]pk ), and sends the result
to CSP.
Step-2 (@CSP): Uses SK (2) to decrypt K , and obtains l.
If L(l) > L(N)/2, CSP denotes u′ = 1 and u′ = 0
otherwise. Then, CSP uses pk to encrypt u′, and sends
[u′]pk to CP.
Step-3 (@CP): Once [u′]pk is received, CP computes as
follows: if s = 1, CP denotes [u∗]pk = CR([u′]pk );
otherwise, CP computes
[u∗]pk = [1]pk · ([u′]pk )N−1 = [1 − u′]pk .
If u∗ = 0, it shows x ≥ y; and if u∗ = 1, it shows x < y.
E. Secure Maximum and Minimum Sorting Protocol (SMMS)
Given two encrypted numbers [x]pka and [y]pkb , the
goal of SMMS protocol is to obtain the encrypted sorting
results [A]pk and [I ]pk , s.t., A ≥ I . The description of
the SMMS protocol is as follows:
(1) CP and CSP jointly calculate
[x]pk ← SAD([x]pka ; [0]pkb );
[y]pk ← SAD([0]pka ; [y]pkb );
[u∗]pk ← SLT([x]pka ; [y]pkb );
[X]pk ← SMD([u∗]pk ; [x]pka );
[Y ]pk ← SMD([u∗]pk ; [y]pkb ).
(2) Once [u∗]pk is received, CP computes
[A]pk = [x]pk · [X]N−1pk · [Y ]pk = [(1 − u∗)x + u∗y]pk ;
[I ]pk = [y]pk · [Y ]N−1pk · [X]pk = [(1 − u∗)y + u∗x]pk .
F. Secure Equivalent Testing Protocol (SEQ)
Given two encrypted data [x]pka and [y]pkb , the goal of SEQ
protocol is to obtain the encrypted result [ f ]pk to determine
whether the plaintext of the two encrypted data are equal
(i.e. x = y). The description of the SEQ protocol is as follows:
(1) CP and CSP jointly calculate
[u1]pk ← SLT([x]pka , [y]pkb );
[u2]pk ← SLT([y]pkb , [x]pka );
[ f ∗1 ]pk ← SMD([1]pk · ([u1]pk )N−1; [u2]pk );
[ f ∗2 ]pk ← SMD([u1]pk ; [1]pk · ([u2]pk )N−1).
(2) CP calculates and outputs [ f ]pk as follows:
[ f ]pk = [u1 ⊕ u2]pk = [ f ∗1 ]pk · [ f ∗2 ]pk .
If f = 0, then x = y; otherwise, x 
= y.
G. Secure Division Protocol (SDIV)
Given an encrypted numerator [y]pkb and an encrypted
denominator [x]pka , the SDIV will provide the encrypted
quotient [q∗]pk and encrypted remainder [r∗]pk , without
compromising the privacy of data, s.t., y = q∗ · x + r∗
(|y| ≥ |x |). The SDIV is explained in Algorithm 1, and a
brief description is given below.
In the event that the value of the denominator is 0, we
will mark x = 1 and y = 0 as we cannot simply abort
SDIV. Otherwise, CP will know that x = 0 once SDIV is
aborted (lines 1-5). We will then use SSBA to obtain [x∗]pk
and [y∗]pk (x∗ and y∗ are the absolute value of x and y,
line 6), and SBD to expand [y∗]pk into encrypted bits,
denoted as ([qμ−1]pk , · · · , [q0]pk ) (line 7). Also, we use
([0]pk , · · · , [0]pk ) to initialize ([aμ−1]pk , · · · , [a0]pk )
(line 8). Next, the following procedures will be executed
μ-times: move [aμ−1]pk , · · · [a0]pk , [qμ−1]pk , · · · , [q0]pk
by one position to the left (i.e. mark [ai ]pk = [ai−1]pk
for i = μ − 1 to 1, and mark both [a0]pk = [qμ−1]pk
and [qi ]pk = [qi−1]pk for i = μ − 1 to 1). Then, the CP
calculates [aμ−1]pk , · · · , [a0]pk and converts from binary
to integer [A]pk before comparing A with x∗ using SLT.
If A < x∗, SDIV will mark q0 = 0; otherwise, SDIV will
mark q0 = 1 and compute A = A − x∗ (lines 9-15).
After calculating μ times, the remainder r is the integer
value of (aμ−1, · · · , a0) while the value quotient q is the
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Algorithm 1 Secure Division Protocol (SDIV)
Input: Encrypted numerator [y]pkb and encrypted denominator[x]pka .
Output: Encrypted quotient [q∗]pk and encrypted remainder[r∗]pk
1 Both CP and CSP jointly calculate
2 [ f ]pk ← SEQ([x]pka , [0]pk ).
3 CP calculates [1]pk · ([ f ]pk )N−1 = [1 − f ]pk .
4 Then, both CP and CSP jointly calculate
[ f · x]pk ← SMD([ f ]pk , [x]pka ) and[y′]pk = [ f · y]pk ← SMD([ f ]pk , [y]pk ).
5 CP calculates
[x ′]pk = [ f · x + (1 − f ) · 1]pk = [ f · x]pk · [1 − f ]pk .
6 CP and CSP jointly execute
([x∗]pk , [sx ]pk ) ← SSBA([x ′]pka ),
([y∗]pk , [sy ]pk ) ← SSBA([y′]pkb ).
7 Both CP and CSP jointly execute SBD, s.t.,
([yμ−1]pk , · · · , [y0]pk ) ← SBD([y∗]pk ) and mark
([qμ−1]pk , · · · , [q0]pk ) ← ([yμ−1]pk , · · · , [y0]pk ).
8 CP also initializes
([aμ−1]pk , · · · , [a0]pk ) ← ([0]pk , · · · , [0]pk︸ ︷︷ ︸
μ−elements
).
9 for executing μ times do
10 denote [ai ]pk = [ai−1]pk (for i = μ to 1); then denote[a0]pk = [qμ−1]pk ; finally, denote[qi ]pk = [qi−1]pk (for i = μ to 1);
11 calculate [A]pk = [a0]pk · [a1]2pk · · · [aμ−1]2
μ−1
pk ;
12 calculate [Q]pk ← SLT([A]pk ; [x∗]pk );
13 calculate [q0]pk = [1]pk · [Q]N−1pk = [1 − Q]pk ;
14 execute [B]pk ← SMD([x∗]N−1pk , [q0]pk );
15 calculate [A]pk = [A]pk · [B]pk and then execute SBD
protocol as:
([aμ−1]pk , · · · [a0]pk ) ← SBD([A]pk );
16 Finally, calculates
[r ]pk = [a0]pk · ([a1]pk )2 · · · ([aμ−1]pk )2
μ−1 ;
[q]pk = [q0]pk · ([q1]pk )2 · · · ([qμ−1]pk )2
μ−1 ;
17 Computes [K1]pk ← SMD([sx ]pk ; [sy ]pk );
[r∗]pk ← SMD([r ]pk ; [sy ]pk );
[q∗]pk ← SMD([q]pk ; [K1]pk ).
integer value of (qμ−1, · · · , q0) (line 16). Moreover, we should
decide the sign of r∗ and q∗: the sign of remainder r∗ is the
same to that of the numerator y, while the sign of quotient q∗
is denoted as the multiplication of the sign of numerator and
denominator (line 17). A short example can be demonstrated
the correctness of line 17: if x = 3 and y = 5, we have q∗ = 1
and r∗ = 2, s.t., 5 = 1 × 3 + 2. If x = 3 and y = −5, we
have q∗ = −1 and r∗ = −2, s.t., −5 = (−1) × 3 + (−2).
If x = −3 and y = 5, we have q∗ = −1 and r∗ = 2, s.t.,
5 = (−1) × (−3) + 2. Finally, if x = −3 and y = −5, we
have q∗ = −1 and r∗ = −2, s.t., −5 = 1 × (−3) + (−2).
Here, we give a short example to show how the SDIV
works. Given a numerator y = −5 and a denominator x = 3
as input, the algorithm first gets the absolute value y∗ = 5
and x∗ = 3. The bit formation of y∗ is denoted as q . Next,
the SDIV initializes a = 0000, executes line 9-15, and gets
Algorithm 2 Secure Greatest Common Divisor
Protocol (SGCD)
Input: Two encrypted numbers, [x]pka and [y]pkb .
Output: Encrypted greatest common divisor [C]pk .
1 Both CP and CSP jointly execute SMMS, s.t.,
([y′]pk , [x ′]pk ) ← SMMS([x]pka , [y]pkb );
2 for i = 1 to μ do
3 calculate ([qi ]pk , [ri ]pk ) ← SDIV([y′]pk , [x ′]pk );
4 denote [y′]pk = [x ′]pk and [x ′]pk = [ri ]pk ;
5 denote [r0]pk = [q1]pk ;
6 for i = 0 to μ do
7 calculate [ui ]pk ← SEQ([ri ]pk , [0]pk );
8 for i = 1 to μ do
9 execute [ f ∗i−1,i ]pk ← SMD([1]pk · [ui−1]N−1pk ; [ui ]pk );
10 execute [ f ∗i,i−1]pk ← SMD([ui−1]pk ; [1]pk · [ui ]N−1pk );
11 calculate
[ fi−1,i ]pk = [ui−1 ⊕ ui ]pk = [ f ∗i,i−1] · [ f ∗i−1,i ]pk ;
12
[Ci ]pk ← SMD([ri−1]pk ; [ fi−1,i ]pk );
13 calculate and return [C]pk =
∏m
j=1[Ci ]pk .
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF SDIV
q = 1 and r = 2 as shown in the Table I. Finally, the algorithm
should decide the sign of quotient and remainder, and output
q∗ = −1 and r∗ = −2.
H. Secure Greatest Common Divisor Protocol (SGCD)
Given two encrypted numbers [x]pka and [y]pkb (x > 0,
y > 0)4, SGCD will provide the encrypted GCD [C]pk ,
without compromising the privacy of data. SGCD is explained
in Algorithm 2, and a brief description is given below.
Prior to calculating the GCD, CP needs to determine which
of the two plaintext values (i.e. x and y) is larger, as the larger
value will be chosen as the numerator and the smaller value as
the denominator to run SDIV. Next, in order to calculate GCD
privately, we revisit the Euclidean algorithm: the GCD of two
numbers does not change if the larger number is substituted
with the difference between the two numbers. Since this
substitution reduces the larger of the two numbers, repeating
4Mathematically, we only consider the greatest common divisor (GCD)
between both positive integers.
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this process gives successively smaller pairs of numbers until
one of the two numbers reaches zero. However, we are not
able to use the Euclidean algorithm as it is, without leaking
information since the adversary will know how many protocol
rounds have been executed (e.g. the adversary knows the
two integers are coprime, as only two rounds of calculation
have been performed). Therefore, we will run the Euclidean
algorithm for fixed μ rounds (related to the domain size of
the integer, line 2-4). Unfortunately, the denominator will be
equal to zero if the number of calculation rounds is fixed.
This issue is resolved by SDIV (as explained in Section V-G).
After running the fixed calculation rounds, CP obtains μ + 1
encrypted remainders. The GCD between x and y is the last
non-zero remainder. We only need to determine the first zero
value remainder, and use the zero remainder to find the GCD.
The idea is easy to follow: we denote the non-zero remainder
as 1 and the zero remainder as 0 (line 6-7). We use XOR
operations to find the position of the last non-zero remainder
(line 8-12) – see Algorithm 2.
I. Decryption With Fine-Grained Authentication
Once a RU wishes to retrieve some data from DP a, the
RU must get the authorization from DP a (as the owner of the
data is DP a). If a RU wants to perform some calculations
over different DPs (i.e. different encrypted domains), the
calculated results will contain information about the original
data. Without deploying any specific authorization mechanism,
the final result may leak some information about the data
from the individual DP. Such attacks are simple and efficient.
For example, a RU constructs a query and CP will compute
accordingly to the protocol. After the calculation is completed,
DP will request both CP and CSP to transform the results into
RU’s domain. Then, RU can easily obtain the results after the
decryption. In other words, if a RU ρ is interested in DP i ’s
encrypted data [x]pki stored in the cloud, ρ sends [1]pkρ to
the cloud and CP will compute [x]pkρ ← SMD([x]pki ; [1]pkρ ),
and [x]pkρ will be sent to DP ρ for decryption to
obtain x .
In order to solve this problem, we present a simple yet
elegant solution. The final results will be encrypted using
the joint public key associated with different DPs and
the RU. If the RU wishes to obtain the final plaintext, the
RU needs to obtain partial decrypted results (authorization)
from the involved DPs. For example, a RU ρ’s public key is
pkρ = (N, g, ha = gθρ ), DP a and DP b public keys are
pka = (N, g, ha = gθa ) and pkb = (N, g, hb = gθb),
respectively. The final result x is encrypted with
pk = (N, g, h = gθρ+θa+θb) (i.e. [x]pk ). For the
RU to decrypt the result, [x]pk should be first sent to
both DP a and DP b for decryption authorization. If DP a
(and DP b) allows the RU to access the finally results,
DP a (DP b) executes PWDec1 to generate partial decrypted
ciphertext W Ta (W Tb) to the RU ρ. Once both partial
decrypted ciphertext and original ciphertext are received, the
RU should execute PWDec2 using skρ = θρ to obtain x .
We regard our solution to be fine-grained as it is related
to each encrypted result, at the cost of a communication
round between CP and all DPs.5 If the system does not
need this fine-grained authorization, the system can simply
use traditional authentication method to authorize DPs and
RUs [23], [24]. In this situation, DPs can be offline after
outsourcing the data.
J. The Extension to Handle Encrypted Rational Number
If DP i wishes to outsource the rational numbers to CP for
storage, a key challenge is ensuring secure encryption of the
rational numbers prior to outsourcing.
As any rational number can be presented as a fraction
(i.e. x can be stored as x↑/x↓), the storage challenge can
be easily solved by encrypting the numerator x↑ and denom-
inator x↓, and storing ([x↑]pki , [x↓]pki ), where pki is DP
i ’s public key. For example, −0.2 can be represented as
−1/5 = x↑/x↓. Using the DT-PKC scheme, we encrypt
x↑ and x↓ as [x↑]pki = ([1]pki )N−1 = [−1]pki and
[x↓]pki = [5]pki . After the encryption, ([x↑]pki , [x↓]pki ) are
outsourced to the CP.
Another challenge is performing encrypted rational num-
ber calculations in a multi-key setting. This challenge can
be easily solved using combination of operations with
secure integer calculation toolkit for multi-key. For instance,
given two encrypted rational numbers ([x↑]pka , [x↓]pka ) and
([y↑]pkb , [y↓]pkb ), the rational number multiplication result is
([z↑]pk , [z↓]pk ), where
[z↑]pk ← SMD([x↑]pka ; [y↑]pkb );
[z↓]pk ← SMD([x↓]pka ; [y↓]pkb ).
The constructions of other rational calculation are trivial, and
due to space constraints, we will not discuss the constructions
in this paper, and refer reader to read [25].
1) The Necessity of CSP: To ensure efficiency, we use AHC
for data encryption before outsourcing to CP for storage. Since
we use AHC (or other partial homomorphic cryptosystem),
we will need CSP to perform plaintext multiplication, as the
CP is not able to perform both addition and multiplication
homomorphic calculations over encrypted data at the same
time (unlike, a fully homomorphic cryptosystem). Unfortu-
nately, both single key and multiple keys fully homomorphic
cryptosystem in the existing scheme are rather inefficient,
in terms of computation and storage [26], [27], [43], [44].
In the near future, if an efficient multi-key fully homomorphic
cryptosystem exists, we can remove the CSP from the system
which will also result in a more elegant system.
2) The Extension to Handle Real Number: In our system,
we use the nearest rational number to simulate the real number,
at the cost of some accuracy. For example, we represent
√
2
with 1.414 (i.e. 707500 ). If we want a higher level of accuracy, we
can use 1.41421 (i.e. 141421100000) to represent
√
2. In other words, a
higher level of accuracy will require a longer plaintext length.
5A RU can obtain the data from some specific DPs for calculation. Such
information can be protected from the adversary by involving all DPs in the
execution of PWdec1. If the information does not need to be protected, only
the necessary DPs are involved in the partial decryption.
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VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze the security of the basic
encryption primitive and the sub-protocols, before demonstrat-
ing the security of our EPOM framework.
A. Analysis of DT-PKC
1) The Existence of Strong Private Key Splitting: We ran-
domly split the strong private key SK = λ into two parts,
denoted as λ1 and λ2, s.t., both λ1 + λ2 ≡ 0 mod λ and
λ1 + λ2 ≡ 1 mod N2 hold. Since gcd(λ, N2) = 1, thus ∃s,
s.t. both s ≡ 0 mod λ and s ≡ 1 mod N2 hold (according to
the Chinese remainder theorem [28]; s = λ · (λ−1 mod N2)
mod λN2). Therefore, we only need to randomly choose
λ1 and λ2, s.t., λ1 + λ2 = s.
2) Security of DT-PKC: The security of our DT-PKC is
given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The DT-PKC scheme described in Section IV
is semantically secure, based on the assumed intractability of
the DDH assumption over Z∗N2 [20].
Proof: The security of DT-PKC follows directly from
that of the public-key cryptosystem with a double trapdoor
decryption, which has been proven to be semantically secure
in the standard model assuming the intractability of the DDH
assumption over Z∗N2 [20] (the hardness of DDH assumption
over Z∗N2 can be found in [20]).
The privacy of divided private key is guaranteed by Shamir
secret sharing scheme [29] which is information-theoretic
secure. The strong private key SK is randomly split into
two shares in a way that any less than two shares cannot
recover the original SK (i.e., (2, 2)-Shamir secret sharing
technique is used). It further implies that the adversary cannot
cover the original plaintext with less than two shares of partial
decrypted ciphertexts (as the adversary can select a share all
by himself). 
B. Security Model Definition
Here, we recall the security model for securely realizing
an ideal functionality in the presence of non-colluding semi-
honest adversaries [30]. For simplicity, we use the scenario
involving two parties, DP a (i.e. “Da”) and DP b (i.e. “Db”),
and two servers CP (i.e. “S1”) and CSP (i.e. “S2”). We refer
the reader to [31] for the general case definition.
Let P = (Da, Db, S1, S2) be the set of all protocol parties.
We consider four kinds of adversaries (ADa ,ADb ,AS1,AS2 )
that corrupt Da, Da , S1 and S2, respectively. In the real world,
Da and Db run with inputs x and y (with additional auxiliary
inputs zx and zy), respectively, while S1 and S2 receive
auxiliary inputs z1 and z2. Let H ⊂ P be the set of honest
parties. Then, for every P ∈ H , let outP be the output of
party P . If P is corrupted (i.e. P ∈ P\H ), then outP denotes
the view of P during the protocol 
.
For every P∗ ∈ P , the partial view of P∗ in a real-
world execution of protocol 
 in the presence of adversaries
A = (ADa ,ADb ,AS1,AS2) is defined as
RE AL P
∗

,A,H,z(x, y) = {outP : P ∈ H } ∪ outP∗ .
In the ideal world, there is an ideal functionality f for a
function f and the parties interact only with f . Here, the
challenge DP a and DP b send x and y to f , respectively.
If either x or y is ⊥, then f returns ⊥. Finally, f returns
f (x, y) to the challenge RU. As before, let H ⊂ P be the
set of honest parties. Then, for every P ∈ H , let outP be the
output returned by f to party P . If P is corrupted, then outP
is the same value returned by P .
For every P∗ ∈ P , the partial view of P∗ in an ideal-
world execution in the presence of independent simulators
Sim= (SimDa , SimDb , SimS1, SimS2) is defined as
I DE AL P
∗
f,Sim,H,z(x, y) = {outP : P ∈ H } ∪ outP∗ .
Informally, a protocol 
 is considered secure against non-
colluding semi-honest adversaries if it partial emulates, in the
real world, an execution of f in the ideal world. More formally,
Definition 1: Let f be a deterministic functionality among
parties in P . Let H ⊂ P be the subset of honest parties
in P . We say that 
 securely realizes f if there exists a set
Sim= (SimDa , SimDb, SimS1, SimS2) of PPT transformations
(where Sim Da = Sim Da (ADa ) and so on) such that for all
semi-honest PPT adversaries A = (ADa ,ADb ,AS1,AS2), for
all inputs x, y and auxiliary inputs z, and for all parties P ∈ P
it holds
{RE AL P∗
,A,H,z(λ, x, y)}λ∈N
c≈ {I DE AL P∗f,Sim,H,z(λ, x, y)}λ∈N
where
c≈ denotes computational indistinguishability.
C. The Security of Sub-Protocols
Here, we prove the security of the sub-protocols based on
the security model defined in Section VI-B.6
Theorem 2: The SAD protocol described in Section V-A
securely computes addition over ciphertext across domains
in the presence of semi-honest (non-colluding) adversaries
A = (ADa ,ADb ,AS1,AS2).
Proof: Here, we show how to construct four independent
simulators, namely SimDa , SimDb , SimS1, SimS2 .
SimDa receives x as input and simulates ADa as follows:
It generates encryption [x]pka ← Enc(pka, x) of x , returns
[x]pka to ADa , and outputs ADa ’s entire view. The view of
ADa consists of the encrypted data. The views of ADa in
both real and ideal executions are indistinguishable due to the
semantic security of DT-PKC.
SimDb works analogously to SimDa .
SimS1 simulates AS1 as follows: It generates (fictitious)
encryptions of the inputs [xˆ]pka and [yˆ]pkb by running
Enc(·, ·) on randomly chosen xˆ, yˆ, randomly generates
ra, rb ∈ ZN , and calculates Xˆ and Yˆ . Then, it calculates Xˆ ′ and
Yˆ ′ using PWDec1(·, ·). After that, SimS1 sends the encryption
Xˆ , Yˆ , Xˆ ′ and Yˆ ′ to AS1 . If AS1 replies with ⊥, then SimS1
6Although the model described in Section VI-B can be employed to protect
the content of the data (including the input data and its final output), this
model does not capture information leakage due to data access pattern. The
latter can be solved using oblivious RAM for secure two-party computation,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer interested reader to [32]
for the construction.
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returns ⊥. The view of AS1 consists of the encrypted data it
creates. In both real and the ideal executions, it receives the
output of the encryptions Xˆ , Yˆ , Xˆ ′, and Yˆ ′. In the real world,
it is guaranteed by the fact that the DPs are honest and the
semantic security of DT-PKC. The views of AS1 in the real
and the ideal executions are indistinguishable.
SimS2 simulates AS2 as follows: It randomly chooses Sˆ,
uses the Enc(·, ·) to obtain [Sˆ]pk , and then sends the encryp-
tion to AS2 . If AS2 replies with ⊥, then SimS2 returns ⊥. The
view of AS2 consists of the encrypted data it creates. In both
real and the ideal executions, it receives the output of the
encryptions [S]pk . In the real world, it is guaranteed by the
semantic security of DT-PKC. The views of AS1 in the real
and the ideal executions are indistinguishable. 
The security proof of SMD is similar to that of SAD
protocol under the semi-honest (non-colluding) adversaries
A = (ADa ,ADb ,AS1,AS2). In the following section, we
prove the security of SLT.
Theorem 3: The SLT protocol described in Section V-D
is to securely evaluate the comparison result of plaintext
over ciphertext in the presence of semi-honest (non-colluding)
adversaries A = (ADa ,ADb ,AS1,AS2).
Proof: We now demonstrate how to construct four inde-
pendent simulators, namely: SimDa , SimDb , SimS1, SimS2 .
SimDa receives x as input and then simulates ADa as
follows: It generates encryption [x]pka ← Enc(pka, x) of x ,
prior to returning [x]pka to ADa and producing ADa ’s entire
view. The view of ADa consists of the encrypted data. The
views of ADa in both real and the ideal executions are
indistinguishable due to the semantic security of DT-PKC.
SimDb works analogously to SimDa .
SimS1 simulates AS1 as follows: it generates (fictitious)
encryptions of the inputs [xˆ]pka and [yˆ]pkb by running
Enc(·, ·) on randomly chosen xˆ, yˆ. Then, it calculates [xˆ1]pka
and [yˆ1]pkb , which are used as inputs to Sim(SAD)S1 (·) and
generate [lˆ]pk according to the randomly tossed coin sˆ.
It calculates [lˆ1]pk and Kˆ using [lˆ]pk , randomly tosses a
coin uˆ∗, and generates [uˆ∗]pk by running Enc(·, ·). Finally,
the encryption [lˆ1]pk , Kˆ , and the middle encrypted data
executed by Sim(SAD)S1 (·, ·) are sent to AS1 . If AS1 replies
with ⊥, then SimS1 returns ⊥. In the real world, this is
guaranteed by the fact that the DPs are honest and the semantic
security of DT-PKC. The views of AS1 in both real and ideal
executions are indistinguishable.
SimS2 is analogous to SimS1 . 
The security proofs of SEQ, SSBA, SDIV, SMMS, and
SGCD are similar to that of SLT under the semi-honest (non-
colluding) adversaries A = (ADa ,ADb ,AS1,AS2). Next, we
will demonstrate that our EPOM is secure under an active
adversary A∗ defined in III-C.
D. Security of EPOM
If A∗ eavesdrops on the transmission between the challenge
RU and the CP, the original encrypted data and the final results
will be obtained by A∗. Moreover, ciphertext results (obtained
by executing SAD, SMD, SLT, SSBA, SMMS, SEQ, SDIV,
and SGCD) transmitted between CP and CSP may also be
made available to A∗ due to the eavesdropping. As these data
are encrypted during transmission, A∗ will not be able to
decrypt the ciphertext without knowing the challenge DP’s
private key due to the semantic security of the DT-PKC cryp-
tosystem. Next, suppose A∗ has compromised CP or CSP to
obtain the partial strong private key. However, A∗ is unable to
recover the strong private key to decrypt the ciphertext, as the
private key is randomly split by executing SKeyS algorithm of
DT-PKC. Even when A∗ obtains all plaintext value from the
sub-protocols by compromising CSP, it is still unable for A∗
to obtain useful information as our protocols use the known
technique of “blinding” the plaintext [33]: given an encryption
of a message, we use the additive homomorphic property of
the DT-PKC cryptosystem to add a random message to it.
Therefore, original plaintext is “blinded”. In the event that
A∗ gets hold of private keys belonging to other DPs/RUs
(i.e. not the challenge DPs/RUs), A∗ is still unable to decrypt
the challenge DP’s ciphertext or the challenge RU’s final result
due to the unrelated property of different DP and RU’s weak
private keys in our system (recall private keys in the system
are selected randomly and independently).
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of EPOM.
A. Experiment Analysis
The computation cost and communication overhead of the
proposed EPOM were evaluated using a custom simulator
built in Java, and the evaluations were performed on a per-
sonal computer (PC) with 3.6 GHz eight-cores processor and
12 GB RAM memory.
1) Basic Crypto Primitive & Protocols’ Performance: We
first evaluate the performance of our basic cryptographic
primitive and toolkit for integer on our PC testbed –
see Tables II and III, respectively. We denote N as 1024 bits to
achieve 80-bit security levels [34]. We then use a smartphone
with eight-core processor (4×Cortex-A17 + 4×Cortex-A7)
and 2 GB RAM memory to evaluate the performance of the
basic crypto primitive – see Table II. The evaluations demon-
strated that the algorithms in DT-PKC are suitable for both PC
and smartphone deployments. Note that the toolkit for integer
number calculations is designed for outsourced computation;
therefore, they are only evaluated in the PC testbed.
2) Factors Affecting Protocols’ Performance: For our pro-
posed DT-PKC, the length of N will affect the running time
of the proposed cryptosystem. From Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b),
we observe that both run time and communication overhead of
the basic algorithms increase with N . This is because run time
of the basic operations (modular multiplication and exponent)
increases as N increases, resulting in the transmission of
more bits. For the toolkit of integer protocols, two factors
will affect the performance, namely: (i) length of N (for all
protocols), and (ii) domain size of the plaintext (for SBD,
SDIV, and SGCD). From Fig. 2(c) - Fig. 2(h), we observe that
both computational and communication costs of all protocols
increase with N , as the protocols rely on the basic DT-PKC
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TABLE II
THE PERFORMANCE OF DT-PKC (1000-TIME ON AVERAGE, 80-BIT SECURITY LEVEL)
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE OF SUB-PROTOCOL (1000-TIMES
FOR AVERAGE, 80-BITS SECURITY LEVEL)
and basic operations. From Fig. 2(i) - Fig. 2(k), we observe
that SBD, and the computational cost and the communication
overhead in both SDIV and SGCD increase with the plaintext
bit length. This is due to the increase in encrypted data which
consumes more computation and communication resources.
Next, we present the theoretical analysis for EPOM.
a) Optimization: From Fig. 2 and Table III, we note
that both computational overhead and communication cost at
the server’s side are relatively high. Thus, it is important
to find solutions to speed up server-side computation and
reduce communication rounds. First, some protocol steps can
be processed in parallel. For example, in the SEQ protocol,
two SLT protocols can execute simultaneously, following by
simultaneous execution of two SMD protocols; thus, reducing
four communication rounds into two. In addition, privacy-
preserving calculation for each tuple can be processed inde-
pendently. Therefore, we can use parallel computing [35], [36]
to solve the problem (i.e. all tuples can be processed in parallel
and simultaneously). We can also use GPU [37], [38] to
accelerate the computation. Specifically, using GPU allows
us to execute individual protocols simultaneously, whilst in
our experiment, we use CPU-based calculation and serial
computing to execute the protocol one at a time. For individual
protocol acceleration, we can also choose to use a server with
higher performance specification or a cloud.
B. Theoretical Analysis
1) Computational Overhead: Let us assume that one reg-
ular exponentiation operation with an exponent of length
|N | requires 1.5|N | multiplications [39] (i.e. length of r is
|N | and that computing gr requires 1.5|N | multiplications).
As an exponentiation operation is more costly than an addi-
tion operation or a multiplication operation, we ignore the
fixed numbers of addition and multiplication operations in
our analysis. For the DT-PKC scheme, Enc and CR algo-
rithm require 3|N | multiplications to encrypt the message,
WDec algorithm costs 1.5|N | multiplications to decrypt the
message, PDecW1 needs 1.5|N | multiplications to process,
and PDecW2 needs 1.5|N | + κ multiplications. SDec needs
1.5|N | multiplications to decrypt the ciphertextï¼Œ PDecS1
needs 4.5|N | multiplications to process, and PDecS2 needs
4.5|N | multiplications.
For the basic sub-protocols, it costs 21|N | multiplications
for CP and 12|N | for CSP by executing the SAD protocol.
For the SMD protocol, it costs 45|N | multiplications for CP
and 27|N | multiplications for CSP to run. For the SMMS
protocol, it costs 172.5|N | multiplications for CP and 97.5|N |
multiplications for CSP to run. For the SBD protocol, it costs
between 13.5μ|N | multiplications (best case) and 16.5μ|N |
multiplications (worst case) for CP, and takes 7.5μ|N | mul-
tiplications for CSP to run. For the SSBA protocol, it costs
58.5|N | multiplications for CP and 34.5|N | multiplications
for CSP to run. For the SLT protocol, it costs 34.5|N |
multiplications for CP and 19.5|N | multiplications for CSP
to run. For the SEQ protocol, it costs 165|N | multiplications
for CP and 93|N | multiplications for CSP to run. For the SDIV
protocol, it costs O(μ2|N | + μ3) multiplications for CP and
costs O(μ2|N |) multiplications for CSP to run. For the SGCD
protocol, it costs O(μ3|N | + μ4) multiplications for CP and
O(μ3|N |) multiplications for CSP.
2) Communication Overhead: In the DT-PKC scheme, each
T1, T2, CT and W T require 2|N | bits to represent. Thus, the
ciphertext [x]pk needs 4|N | bits to transmit. For the basic sub-
protocols, it takes 16|N | bits between CP and CSP to run the
SAD protocol. Also, it takes 36|N | bits between CP and CSP
to run the SMD protocol, 46|N | bits to run the SSBA protocol,
174|N | bits to run the SLT protocol, 278|N | bits to run the
SMMS protocol, 420|N | bits for the SEQ protocol, 10μ|N |
bits to run the SBD protocol, O(μ2|N |) bits to run the SDIV
protocol, and O(μ3|N |) bits to run the SGCD protocol.
C. Comparative Summary
Our EPOM is closely related to the work in [33], where
two servers (C and S) are used to process the encrypted data
under multiple keys. The multi-key ciphertexts are stored in
server C, while server S directly holds the strong private key.
However, as we pointed out in Section IV, the decryption
ability of strong trapdoor is too powerful (i.e. capability
to decrypt all ciphertexts in the system). Consequently, any
leakage or (insider) abuse would result in a major compromise
of the system (i.e. single point of attack). For example, a
compromised server S can be used to decrypt all ciphertexts
in the transmission link. Our approach differs from [33] in
the sense that EPOM randomly separates the strong trapdoor
into two shares,7 and distributes the shares to two differ-
ent servers. Only when both servers work together can the
ciphertext be successfully decrypted. This decreases the risk.
7For enhanced security (protection of key leaking), the strong trapdoor can
be further separated into n shares, s.t.,
∑
i λi ≡ 0 mod λ and
∑
i λi ≡ 1
mod N2 hold at the same time. The shares are then distributed to n − 1
CSP and CP for storage respectively. This will require an additional n − 2
servers in the system.
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TABLE IV
COMPARATIVE SUMMARY
Moreover, in order to achieve multiplication of the plaintexts
in [40], the KeyProd protocol should be first used to transfer
the ciphertexts with different public keys into the ciphertexts
with a same joint public key, without changing the correspond-
ing plaintext value. Then, the Mult protocol needs to be used
to achieve the plaintext multiplication using the transferred
ciphertexts. In all, two rounds of communication are necessary
to achieve multiplication of the plaintexts in [33]. In EPOM,
only one round of communication is required (i.e. SMD).
In addition, two protocols are constructed to achieve secure
addition and multiplication under multi-key in [33], whilst
EPOM realizes commonly used secure operations under multi-
key, such as comparison, division, etc. We also remark that
our EPOM can be extended to store and process data beyond
integer numbers. A comparative summary between the two
schemes is shown in Table IV.
VIII. RELATED WORK
With the constant evolution of cloud and related technolo-
gies, more users choose to encrypt before outsource their
own data to cloud servers for storage. However, it is impor-
tant to ensure the security and privacy of outsourced data.
While homomorphic encryption technique allows searching
of encrypted data, it is not yet practical to do so. More
specifically, Gentry [40] constructed the first fully homomor-
phic encryption scheme based on lattice-based cryptography
to support an arbitrary number of addition and multiplication
operations. Since the seminal work of Gentry in 2009, a num-
ber of single-key fully homomorphic encryption schemes
(see [41], [42]) and multi-key fully homomorphic encryption
schemes (see [12], [43], [44]) had been proposed. However,
one of the biggest drawbacks of fully homomorphic cryptosys-
tems is complexity in both computation (including encryption
and decryption) and storage (including both public/private key
size and ciphertext size). It is not yet practical to implement
fully homomorphic cryptosystem in the real-world [26], [27].
Partial homomorphic encryptions (including additive and
multiplicative homomorphic encryption) are often considered
the next best solution. However, partial homomorphic encryp-
tions can only handle one kind of homomorphic operation with
arbitrary times. Additive homomorphic encryption scheme,
such as Paillier cryptosystem [15] and Benaloh cryptosys-
tem [16], allows other parties to securely perform some
additive homomorphic calculations over the ciphertext. Multi-
plicative homomorphic encryption scheme, such as unpadded
RSA cryptosystem [45] and El-Gamal cryptosystem [46],
allows some multiplication over the plaintext. In recent years,
some cryptosystems attempt to provide for both additive and
multiplicative operations. However, these systems generally
achieve only limited numbers of homomorphic operations.
For example, the BGN cryptosystem [47] can only support
limited numbers of additive homomorphic operations and only
one multiplicative homomorphic operation.
A number of privacy-preserving protocols have also been
constructed using partial homomorphic encryption, and exam-
ples include secure sum protocol [48], [49], secure comparison
protocol [50], [51], secure set intersection protocol [52], [53],
secure scalar product protocol [54], [55], secure division
protocol [25], and secure top-k protocol [14]. Moreover, many
real-world applications use these privacy-preserving protocols
for system design. For instance, Li et al. [56] used the secure
set intersection protocol to construct the profile matching
framework. Although these privacy-preserving protocols are
promising, these protocols are designed for a single-key setting
which is not scalable for a real-world outsourced environment.
Peter et al. [33] designed an efficient outsourcing multiparty
computation framework for a multi-key setting. However, the
scheme does not support complex operations, such as securely
perform integer division operation. This is the gap that this
paper contributed to.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new efficient and privacy-
preserving outsourced calculation framework with multiple
keys. The framework is designed to allow different data
providers to securely outsource their data with their own
public key, and for a cloud server to process the multi-key
encryption data on-the-fly. To ensure that the scheme can
be deployed in a real-world application, we proposed a new
cryptographic primitive, Distributed Two Trapdoors Public-
Key Cryptosystem (DT-PKC), to reduce both key management
cost and private key exposure risk. We also built toolkit to per-
form privacy preserving calculations to handle commonly used
integer operations in a privacy preserving way. Our evaluations
demonstrated that our framework (and the underlying building
blocks) are sufficiently efficient for a real-world deployment.
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